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SHEATHING THE SWORD OF FEDERAL
PREEMPTION
Ronald D. Rotunda •
It was not too long ago that federal preemption-the doctrine
that federal law overrides state laws which "impair federal superintendence of the field" even though Congress has not expressed its
intent with any clarity'-was a sword which federal courts used
with some regularity.2 In the closing months of his presidency,
Ronald Reagan issued an Executive Order intended to sheath this
sword. This directive was analogous to the requirement of an environmental impact statement.3 It required executive departments
and agencies to prepare "Preemption Impact Statements." The Order provided, in part, thatTo the extent permitted by law, Executive departments and agencies shall construe, in regulations and otherwise, a Federal Statute to preempt State law only
when the statute contains an express preemption provision or there is some other
firm and palpable evidence compelling the conclusion that the Congress intended
preemption of state law, or when the exercise of State authority directly conflicts
with the exercise of Federal authority under the Federal statute ....
Any regulatory preemption of State law shall be restricted to the minimum level
necessary to achieve the objectives of the statute pursuant to which the regulations
are promulgated. 4

The actual impact of this Executive Order may be far from
earthshaking-not only because it expressly precludes any judicial
review of its requirements,s but more significantly, because the
• Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
I. I R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 12.1, at 624 (1986) (hereinafter ROTUNDA, NOWAK &
YOUNG].
2. For citation of cases, see id. at 624-29.
3. On environmental impact statements, see generally Calvert Cllifs' Coordinating
Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), discussing the provisions of the National
Environmental Policy Act. See a/so R. FINDLEY & D. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN
A NUTSHELL 21-54 (1983).
4. Executive Order No. 12,612 (October 26, 1987), §§ 4(a), (c) (emphasis added), reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (1987).
5. /d. at§ 8.
Judicial Review. This Order is intended only to improve the internal management of the Executive branch, and is not intended to create any right or benefit,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States,
its agencies, its officers, or any person.
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Supreme Court, in its more recent cases, had already anticipated its
strong presumption against preemption. A careful analysis of the
current cases offers strong evidence that the trend of the law is increasingly moving away from preemption. In recent years, the
Supreme Court has already gone far towards keeping the preemption blade in its sheath. Or, to shift, metaphors, before a plaintiff is
able to convince a federal court to rule in favor of preemption, that
plaintiff must overcome new, higher barriers, jump over more
hurdles.
The mere fact that Congress has the constitutional power to
preempt an area does not mean that it has done so. That has long
been the law. The leading decision of Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp.,6 neatly summarizes the test for preemption:
[S]tate law can be pre-empted in either of two general ways. [First,] If Congress
evidences an intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling within that field is
pre-empted. [Second,] If Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over
the matter in question, state law is still pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts
with federal law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal
law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress. 7

A federal administrative regulation may also preempt state law, if
the federal agency is "acting within the scope of its congressionally
delegated authority . . . ."s
This summary of the test is not new. What is new is the vigor
with which the Court applies it in specific fact situations. The
Court has set up an obstacle course which must be crossed before
preemption is reached. Let us now examine some of these obstacles
in more detail, in connection first with the "intent to preempt"
prong of the preemption test, and then with the "actual conflict"
prong.
I

The first prong requires some showing of an intent to preempt.
The mere existence of a federal statute or administrative regulation
furnishes, by itself, no evidence that Congress intended to preempt
concurrent state regulatory activities in the same area. Under such
a system of dual regulation, a person or entity planning to engage in
certain regulated activities must pass two hurdles: first, it must secure the federal agency's permission, and second, it must also obtain state regulatory clearance. For example, federally licensed
6.
7.
8.

464 u.s. 238 (1984).
/d. at 248 (internal citations omitted).
Louisiana Public Service Comm. v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986).
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seagoing vessels may still be compelled to meet local pollution
standards. 9
A leading case illustrating the Court's easy acceptance of concurrent regulation is Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
PauJ.w The Court upheld a California standard regarding the maturity of avocados even though the statute was applied to exclude
certain Florida avocados from California markets. These Florida
avocados had been certified to be mature under federal regulations
but did not meet the stricter California requirements regarding maturity. Florida Lime explicitly rejected the argument "that a federal
license or certificate of compliance with minimum standards immunizes the licensed commerce from inconsistent or more demanding
regulations." The Court admitted that this argument draws some
support from earlier cases involving interstate carriers, but in modem times, the Justices announced, this "suggestion has been significantly qualified." 11
The fact that a federal agency issues regulations governing certain activities also does not suggest that state regulations governing
that area are preempted. First, the Court has required that the federal agency, like Congress, speak clearly. Indeed, if the federal regulations contemplate concurrent state regulations, then the federal
regulations furnish authority against the existence of federal preemption.l2 Even if an agency explicitly preempts state regulations,
the Court requires clear and specific statutory authority for the
agency's action.
In Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC,IJ for example,
the FCC argued that its orders regarding the depreciation of telephone plant and equipment preempted inconsistent state regulation.
The Court, however, found that the congressional statutory scheme
9. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). See also California
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987) (a state statute which requires
employers to provide leave and reinstatement to employees disabled by pregnancy does not
conflict with federal law which specifies that illegal sex discrimination includes discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978) (upholding injunction, as violative of state trespass laws, of
labor picketing which is arguably but not definitely protected by federal law).
10. 373 u.s. 132 (1963).
II. Id. at 141-42 (citing with approval Huron Portland Cement Co., and other cases).
12. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 255 & n.l7. See also California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite
Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419, 1426 (1987) ("If, as Granite Rock claims, it is the federal intent
that Granite Rock conduct its mining unhindered by any state environmental regulation, one
would expect to find the expression of this intent in these Forest Service regulations."); Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 718 (1985) ("because agencies normally address problems in a detailed manner and can speak through a
variety of means, ... we can expect that they will make their intentions clear if they intend
for their regulations to be exclusive.").
13. 476 U.S. 355 (I 986).
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contemplated "a dual regulatory system."I4 Although "the broad
language" of one section in the federal statute "no doubt, [makes it]
possible to find some support" in favor of preemption, the Court did
not find that section sufficiently "unambiguous or straight-forward"
in light of the entire federal statutory scheme. "Nor is the word
'pre-emption' used" in the section relied on to support the power of
the federal agency to preempt.Is
In short, if a federal statutory scheme contemplates a dual federal-state regulatory system, if the federal statutes, when read as a
whole, do not require preemption and do not even use the word
"preemption," and if the agency regulations contemplate concurrent state regulations, then any arguments favoring preemption
should fail. In Louisiana Public Service Comm 'n, for example, the
Court refused to find preemption even though those favoring preemption had argued (1) that "the FCC is entitled to preempt inconsistent state regulation which frustrates federal policy,"I6 and
(2) that "the refusal of the States to accept the FCC-set depreciation
schedules and rules will frustrate the federal policy of increasing
competition in the industry, and thus that (3) state regulation
'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.' "11
Even if the federal agency does not issue a preemptive regulation, Congress can always preempt, but the modem trend is to require Congress to speak with absolute clarity.
In Florida Lime, for example, the Court said that the "princi14. /d. at 370 (emphasis in original).
15. /d. at 377.
16. /d. at 368.
17. Id at 368-69. Another important recent example is California Coastal Comm'n v.
Granite Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419 (1987). Federal law allows private citizens to enter federal
land in order to explore for mineral deposits. If the private citizen locates such a deposit, he
may perfect his claim by complying with various federal requirements. If the claimant so
complies, the federal government retains legal title to the land, but the claimant "shall have
the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines of
their locations .... " 30 U.S.C.A. § 26 (1986) (emphasis added). In addition, the claimant
may secure a land patent; if he does, he obtains legal title to the land. Thus, although Granite
Rock Co. had secured federal approval of its mining plans on federal land, it could not begin
mining until it secured a permit from the California Coastal Commission. Granite Rock
attacked the state permit requirement on its face.
In Granite Rock, the Court held that the claimant who owns an unpatented mining
claim must pass another hurdle; he must still comply with California's permit requirement.
In so holding, it rejected the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that "an independent state permit
system to enforce state environmental standards would undermine the Forest Service's own
permit authority and thus is preempted." Granite Rock Co. v. California Coastal Comm'n,
768 F.2d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 1985). The Solicitor General supported Granite Rock's arguments for preemption. The Supreme Court majority emphasized that if an administrative
regulation declares an intention to preempt, it must do so "with some specificity." Granite
Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 1426. This regulatory scheme did not.
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pie to be derived from our decisions is that federal regulation of a
field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or
that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained."ts A long line of
cases since then has reemphasized that Congress must state its intention clearly. "It will not be presumed that a federal statute was
intended to supersede the exercise of the power of the state unless
there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so. The exercise of
federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed."t9
In determining whether Congress has spoken with sufficient
clarity, the Court has given the party claiming preemption the burden of proof. The party seeking preemption must meet this burden
by demonstrating, with specificity, an intent to preempt. The
Silkwood decision makes this point quite clearly.
Silkwood is a striking illustration of the new reluctance to preempt. Pursuant to state tort law, the estate of Karen Silkwood sued
the Kerr-McGee Corporation for damages caused by exposure to
plutonium from Kerr-McGee's federally licensed nuclear facility.
The only issue before the Court was whether federal nuclear safety
regulations preempted a ten million dollar punitive damage award.
In the previous Term the Court had held that the states were preempted from regulating the safety aspects of nuclear energy.2o The
Court had broadly concluded that the "Federal Government has
occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the States."2t
Based on this recent precedent, Kerr-McGee argued that compliance with federal safety regulations precluded the award of puni18. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (emphasis
added).
19. New York State Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405,413 (1973) (quoting
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-Q3 (1952)). See also Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978)("This Court is generally reluctant to infer preemption .... ").
In Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 107 S. Ct. 2211 (1987), the Court held that a Maine
statute requiring employers to provide a one-time severance payment to employees if there is
a plant closing was not preempted by either ERISA or the NLRA. ERISA explicitly provided that it preempts: "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan .... " 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a) (1984). Nonetheless, the majority
refused to find preemption because they read "plan" to refer to an administrative scheme
rather than to a one-time lump-sum payment. The majority also ruled that there was no
preemption under the NLRA. Justice White joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia,
dissented: "The Court's 'administrative-scheme' rationale provides states with a means of
circumventing congressional intent, clearly expressed in § 1144, to pre-empt all state laws
that relate to employee benefit plans." 107 S. Ct. at 2225.
20. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 u.s. 190 (1983).
21. /d.at212.
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tive damages to Silkwood's estate. The Tenth Circuit agreed. Its
reasoning was straightforward. If the states are preempted from
regulating nuclear safety directly, they cannot regulate it indirectly
via punitive damage awards, because the purpose of punitive damages is to punish bad practices and to deter future similar practices.22 The primary purpose of punitive damages (like the purpose
of regulation) is not to compensate the victim but to change the
behavior of the defendant.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court refused to find preemption:
"Kerr-McGee focuses on the differences between compensatory and
punitive damages awards and asserts that, at most, Congress intended to allow the former. This argument, however, is misdirected
because our inquiry is not whether Congress expressly allowed punitive damages awards. . . . [I]t is Kerr-McGee's burden to show
that Congress intended to preclude such awards. "23
There was no dispute that Kerr-McGee was "subject to exclusive NRC safety regulation .... ",24 and that Congress "prohibit[ed]
the States from regulating the safety aspects of nuclear development
.... "2s The Court noted that the states were not competent to deal
with technical safety considerations. Still, the Supreme Court refused to find preemption because it said that there was "ample evidence that Congress had no intention of forbidding the States to
provide [punitive damage] remedies."26 What was this ample
evidence?
First there was congressional "silence. "27 Second, the Court
found it significant that Congress did not provide "any federal remedy for persons injured by such conduct."2s To which "conduct"
was the Court referring? The evidence showed that Kerr-McGee's
only violations of any regulations during the relevant time "was its
failure to maintain a record of the dates of two urine samples submitted by Silkwood."29 Thus when Silkwood states that Congress
provided no federal remedies from "such conduct," it appears to
suggest that Congress provided for no remedies from radiation injuries which were not causally related to violation of any federal statute or rules; no one, after all, claimed that Karen Silkwood was
injured because Kerr-McGee did not record the dates of two urine
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 246 (1984).
/d. at 255.
/d. at 250 n.ll.
/d. at 250.
/d. at 251.
27. /d.
28. /d. In contrast, not only did Oklahoma provide for punitive damages as well as for
actual damages; it also provided for strict liability. /d. at 245.
29. /d. at 244; see id. at 262 & n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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samples. Third, the Silkwood majority, in finding no preemption,
also relied on the Price-Anderson Act (which set a limit on state
law suits arising out of a nuclear accident), even though the Court
cheerfully conceded that the Act "does not apply to the present situation .... "Jo
The Court also rejected the position advocated by the United
States-that state punitive damage claims are preempted because
the NRC is authorized to impose civil penalties if federal standards
have been violated:
[T]he award of punitive damages in the present case does not conflict with that
scheme. Paying both federal fines and state-imposed punitive damages for the same
incident would not appear to be physically impossible. Nor does exposure to punitive damages frustrate any purpose of the federal remedial scheme.31

We thus end up with an ironic result. Because the Court had
found that the states lack the technological expertise to impose
modest civil fines on a nuclear facility, it ruled that state regulation
of nuclear safety is preempted. Yet a randomly selected jury may
impose a ten million dollar punitive damage award if the nuclear
facility does not measure up to a jury's ex post facto decision as to
what constitutes adequate safety procedures.32
Silkwood, in short, highlights the extreme reluctance of the
modem Court to find preemption. Preemption exists if Congress
clearly and explicitly provides for it by statute. Otherwise, if it is
possible for the party to comply both with the federal law and the
state regulation-if such dual compliance is not "physically impossible"-then the Court is unlikely to find preemption.JJ
II

Apart from passing the "intent to preempt" hurdle, a state law
must also avoid "actual conflict" with federal law. There are two
ways to determine whether a state law is preempted because "it actually conflicts with federal law." First, there is preemption (and
state law "actually conflicts" with federal law) if it is impossible to
comply with both state and federal law. If dual compliance is not
"physically impossible," as in Silkwood, there is no "actual conflict." Second, state law "actually conflicts" with federal law
"where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."J4
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

/d. at 251.
/d. at 257.
See id. at 260 (Blackmon, J., dissenting).
Note also that the Solicitor General argued in favor of preemption. /d. at 257.
/d. at 248.
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CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.,Js is a striking example of the
Court's reluctance to find that state law interferes with the "full
purposes and objectives of Congress." Any obstacles that the state
sets up must be fairly high before the Court will infer preemption.
In CTS the Court upheld an Indiana law which in effect severely
limited hostile corporate takeovers. The practical effect of the law
as applied to corporations incorporated in Indiana was that a takeover required prior approval of a majority of the preexisting disinterested shareholders. The district court and the court of appeals
each held that the Williams Act, a federal law regulating takeovers,
preempted the state law. As the Seventh Circuit noted: "Very few
tender offers could run the gauntlet that Indiana has set up. "36
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found no preemption.
The Court first quickly dismissed, in one sentence, the contention that it was impossible to comply with both the state and federal
law: "Because it is entirely possible for entities to comply with both
the Williams Act and the Indiana Act, the state statute can be preempted only if it frustrates the purpose of the federallaw."J7 Then
the Court turned to the question whether the Indiana law was an
obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
The Court assumed that the purpose of the Williams Act was
to strike "a careful balance between the interests of offerors and
target companies, and that any state statute that upset this balance
35. 107 s. Ct. 1637 (1987).
36. Dynamics Corp. v. CfS Corp., 749 F.2d 250, 263 (7th Cir. 1986). It is difficult to
overemphasize the significance of CTS. Takeovers were one of the major forces behind the
1987 bull market in stocks. The CTS decision and other restrictions on takeovers were
widely viewed as one of the causes leading to the stock market crash of October 19, 1987. As
a Wall Street Journal analysis noted:
No one [at first] had paid much attention, but the underpinnings of the takeover boom had undergone even more severe erosion. In April, the U.S. Supreme
Court, in a surprising decision [the CTS case], upheld an Indiana statute plainly
designed to curb hostile takeovers of Indiana corporations. The ruling seemed to
sanctify other anti-takeover statutes and led to the passage of similar laws in other
states.
Congress, meanwhile, was considering its own package of legislation to curb
takeovers. The proposed tax bill would repeal many tax breaks related to takeovers
and could halt highly leveraged deals.
Even without legislative curbs, there was growing uneasiness that the takeover
boom was nearing an end. As the prices of such deals and the corresponding debt
loads grew ever higher, even a whilf of recession-triggered by higher interest rates,
inftation or a weaker dollar-raised the specter of widespread defaults by debt-ridden companies. Heading into October, the pace of takeovers had turned down from
the year before.
Stewart & Hertzberg, The Crash of'87: Before the Fall. (Part/}, Wall St. J., Dec. 11, 1987, at
14, col. 1. See also Smith, Swartz, & Anders, The Crash of '87: Black Monday, (Part II),
Wall St. J., Dec. 16, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
37. 107 S. Ct. at 1644.
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was preempted."Js Nonetheless the Court ruled that the Williams
Act did not preempt the Indiana law. The purpose of the state law,
said the Court, was not to favor management against offerors, to the
detriment of shareholders; such a purpose would upset the balance
struck by the Williams Act. Instead, the Indiana law "protects the
independent shareholder against both of the contending parties."39
Thus, the purpose of the Indiana law did not frustrate federal law,
even though-in the words of the Seventh Circuit quoted above-"Very few tender offers could run the gauntlet that Indiana has set
up."40
In CTS the state law limited the competition in takeovers. Yet
even before CTS it was clear that federal law does not preempt state
law simply because the federal law provides for more competition
than the state law would accept. In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of
Maryland,4t for example, the Court upheld a Maryland statute
prohibiting oil producers or refiners from operating retail gas service stations within the state and requiring them to extend all temporary price reductions uniformly to all stations that they supply.
The Court held that the congressional expression in favor of vigorous competition found in the Clayton Act and the Robinson-Patman Act did not directly or indirectly preempt the Maryland law.
The Court said that the existence of hypothetical conflicts was too
38. /d. at 1645.
39. !d.
40. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), follows a similar methodology and analysis.
It held that federal law did not preempt a California law which provided criminal penalties if
an employer knowingly employed an illegal alien if such employment would adversely affect
lawful resident workers. The unanimous Court conceded that the power to regulate immigration is an exclusive federal power, but argued that not all state regulation of aliens is a regulation of immigration. Nor does the "comprehensiveness of the INA scheme for regulation"
demand preemption. Congress, it was true, had failed (as of that time) to enact any general
laws criminalizing knowing employment of illegal aliens. Still, the DeCanas Court refused to
find preemption. It found no evidence that Congress " 'unmistakably ... ordained' exclusivity of federal regulation in this field." 424 U.S. at 361. The Court also found persuasive a
reference in the Federal Labor Contractor Registration Act that referred to "appropriate
State law and regulation," although, the Court admitted, this Act was "concerned only with
agricultural employment." /d. at 362. In DeCanas, as in Silkwood, the Solicitor General also
argued that this state law was not appropriate because it conflicted with federal regulation.
/d. at 362 n.ll.
DeCanas conceded that the federal statute making it a felony to harbor illegal entrants
also provided that employment of such illegal entrants does not constitute harboring. The
Court did not even consider the argument that Congress may have refused to define employment as harboring because of a careful balance of competing interests: the national interest in
protecting local employment versus the foreign affairs interest in not antagonizing a petroleum rich neighbor whose citizens constitute a large part of this country's illegal immigrants.
In such circumstances, it would appear that the Court's approval of the California law undermines the federal purpose.
41. 437 u.s. 117 (1978).
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speculative to warrant preemption.42
The Court in Exxon v. Governor also reasoned that, in interpreting the Clayton Act, it "is illogical to infer that by excluding
certain competitive behavior from the general ban against discriminatory pricing, Congress intended to pre-empt the States' power to
prohibit any conduct within that exclusion. This Court is generally
reluctant to infer pre-emption. "43 The appellants argued that the
Maryland statute "'undermin[es]' the competitive balance that
Congress struck between the Robinson-Patman and Sherman
Acts."44 The Court did not so much dispute this argument as find
it irrelevant:
This is merely another way of stating that the Maryland statute will have an anticompetitive effect. In this sense, there is a conflict between the statute and the
central policy of the Sherman Act-our "charter of economic liberty." Nevertheless, this sort of conflict cannot itself constitute a sufficient reason for invalidating
the Maryland statute. For if an adverse effect on competition were, in and of itself,
enough to render a state statute invalid, the States' power to engage in economic
regulation would be effectively destroyed. 4S

The Court then found that the Maryland statute, even though it
had an anticompetitive effect, did not stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of congressional objectives.

III
In general, the party claiming preemption has the burden of
proof. As we have seen, this burden is now quite heavy. In meeting
this burden, the party must persuade the Court that preemption is
proper in one of two general ways.
First, Congress (or a federal agency, if authorized by Congress
to do so), may expressly preempt an area of concern, thereby precluding any state regulation. Because the Court "is generally reluctant to infer preemption,"46 Congress must speak clearly and make
its intention to preempt unmistakable. If a federal agency claims
preemption, it must also speak clearly in its regulations. If the federal scheme contemplates a dual regulatory system and the federal
statutes do not explicitly provide for preemption, the federal courts
will likely find that the federal agency has no authority to preempt
even if its regulations so provide.
Alternatively, the party must demonstrate that federal law
42. /d. at 130-31.
43. /d. at 132.
44. Id. at 133.
45. Jd. at 133 (internal citation omitted).
46. E.g., id. at 132, and cases cited therein.
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preempts state law to the extent that the state law "actually conflicts with federal law." If it is possible to comply with both state
and federal law, there is no "actual conflict." Similarly, there is no
"actual conflict" unless the state law frustrates the purposes of the
federal law. This standard is not easy to meet. For example, as the
cases discussed above show, a state law does not frustrate federal
purposes merely because it provides for less competition, or requires
that federally licensed vessels in interstate commerce also meet local
pollution standards, or prohibits items transported in interstate
commerce that do not meet state maturity standards which are set
higher than federal maturity standards. In all these cases, the state
requirements place hurdles in the way of federal regulation, but
these hurdles are not treated as improper when the Court finds that
Congress did not intend to preclude concurrent state and federal
regulations.
The Court's recent reluctance to infer preemption may be part
of a broader tendency to shift primary responsibility to Congress in
deciding when states should be powerless to act in a given area. If
Congress wishes to preempt, it may certainly do so, merely by expressing its intentions clearly. The Court's recent preemption cases
may be signalling that, out of respect for federalism, the more democratic branches of the central government should be preferred to
make the primary decisions limiting the power of the states to regulate concurrently with the federal government.47 Power and responsibility should go together like pepper and salt. Because
Congress has the ultimate power to decide preemption cases-Congress after all can always overrule the Court on this question-Congress ought to exercise this power unambiguously and shoulder the
ultimate responsibility as well. 48

47. ROTUNDA, NOWAK & YOUNG supra note I, at§ 12.1 See a/so id. at§ II. I.
48. Cf Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), holding that a state court must make
clear that it is deciding a case only on state grounds in order to persuade a federal court that
no federal questions need to be decided because the state grounds are adequate and independent. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Long established an important principle of
federalism: states should not be bound by phantom federal restrictions. If a state court
wishes to impose constitutional restrictions on the state, it may certainly do so, and if those
restrictions are based on the state constitution, the federal courts will not interfere simply
because the state court has gone further in creating constitutional rights (based on the state
constitution) than a federal court would have gone (based on the U.S. Constitution). But if
state courts are going to create rights, they must take the responsibility for doing so and
unambiguously decide the case on state law grounds. Otherwise, state courts could, in effect,
blame the federal Constitution for imposing what are really phantom constitutional restrictions on state government. In order to unleash the states from these phantom federal restrictions, the Supreme Court reviews such cases only where state courts have created
constitutional rights purportedly (and ambiguously) relying on the federal Constitution.

